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Miller v. C. W. Myers Trading Post: North Carolina Adopts
Expansive Tenant Remedies for Violations of the
Implied Warranty of Habitability
In 1977 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the Residential
Rental Agreements Act' which created an implied warranty of habitability in all
residential leaseholds. 2 The Act does not specify the remedies available to an
aggrieved tenant,3 and reported decisions under the Act have until recently only
addressed the landlord's tort liability for personal injury or wrongful death
caused by unfit or dangerous conditions. 4
In Miller v. CW. Myers Trading Post 5 the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals adopted a contract damage formula that guarantees a tenant the difference
between a leasehold's value in compliance with the Act and its value in the cur-
rent "uninhabitable" state.6 The court in Miller held that landlords who pro-
vide tenants with dwellings at below-market rental rates may not escape their
statutory duty to adequately repair and maintain the premises. This Note exam-
ines the development of the implied warranty of habitability in residential lease-
holds, the purposes behind the Residential Rental Agreements Act, and the
potential impact the damage formula adopted in Miller may have on the number
of persons living in substandard housing in North Carolina. The Note con-
cludes that, by giving full effect to the purposes of the general assembly, the
1. Act of June 28, 1977, ch. 770, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1006 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 42-38 to -44 (1984)).
2. Although the Act expressly requires landlords to keep premises "habitable," N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 42-42(a)(2) (1984), and prevents waiver of the rights enumerated, id. § 42-42(b), some com-
mentators have not recognized the Act as "implying a warranty of habitability" as the term is gener-
ally used. See infra note 18 for a discussion of this apparent confusion.
3. North Carolina General Statutes § 42-44 provides in part:
General remedies and limitations.-(a) Any right or obligation declared by this Chapter is
enforceable by civil action, in addition to other remedies of law and in equity.
(c) The tenant may not unilaterally withhold rent prior to a judicial determination of a
right to do so.
(d) A violation of the Article shall not constitute negligence per se.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-44 (1984).
4. See Jackson v. Housing Auth., 73 N.C. App. 363, 326 S.E.2d 295 (1985) (wrongful death by
gas poisoning caused by failure to maintain heating equipment), aff'd, 316 N.C. 259, 341 S.E.2d 523
(1986); Brooks v. Francis, 57 N.C. App. 556, 291 S.E.2d 889 (1982) (plaintiff injured when steps to
leased premises collapsed, but court held plaintiff contributorily negligent); O'Neal v. Kellett, 55
N.C. App. 225, 284 S.E.2d 707 (1981) (tenant fell from dimly lit steps in common area).
5. 85 N.C. App. 362, 355 S.E.2d 189 (1987).
6. Id. at 371, 355 S.E.2d at 194. A dwelling may violate an implied warranty of habitability,
yet remain "habitable" in the literal sense of the word. The North Carolina Supreme Court has
held, for example, that the judicially imposed implied warranty of habitability for the sale of new
homes covers faulty air conditioning units. Gaito v. Auman, 313 N.C. 243, 252, 327 S.E.2d 870, 877
(1985); see also Park Hill Terrace Assoc. v. Glennon, 146 N.J. Super. 271, 277, 369 A.2d 938, 941-42
(1977) (faulty air conditioning affected habitability so as to justify rent abatement). But see Hilder v.
St. Peter, 144 Vt. 150, 160, 478 A.2d 202, 208-09(1984) (de minimis violations of housing code do
not breach warranty). For a discussion of the standards by which habitability is measured under the
warranties of various jurisdictions, see R. SCHOSHINsKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TEN-
ANT § 3:17, at 130-31 (1980).
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decision may accelerate adverse consequences of the Act by encouraging land-
lords to abandon the low-income housing market.
In August 1978, Richard and Brenda Miller began renting a Winston-Sa-
lem house for $175 per month from C.W. Myers Trading Post, Inc. (Myers).7
From the beginning of the tenancy, structural, electrical, and plumbing
problems existed in the residence. 8 In May 1984, the Winston-Salem Commu-
nity Development Department, prompted by a telephone call from Mrs. Miller,
investigated the premises and declared the house unfit for human habitation be-
cause of violations of the Winston-Salem City Housing Code.9 Myers subse-
quently repaired some of the problems cited by the inspectors, but the Millers
contended the house remained uninhabitable. 10
In May 1985, the Millers brought suit in the district court of Forsyth
County, alleging violations of the Residential Rental Agreements Act.11 They
sought recovery of a portion of all rents paid for the period of more than six
years in which they lived in the house. Myers answered that all violations were
corrected by May 1982 and that the statute of limitations barred recovery. 12
The district court granted Myers' motion for summary judgment on the ground
that no genuine issue of material fact existed.' 3
A unanimous panel of the court of appeals reversed, holding that the plead-
ings and depositions of the Millers adequately alleged a nonfulfillment of the
landlord's duties so as to make summary judgment improper. 14 The court fo-
cused on the landlord's alternative defense under Rule 12(b)(6) of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure' 5 as an opportunity to determine, as a matter
of first impression, the contractual damages available to a tenant under the
Act. 1
6
7. Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 364, 355 S.E.2d at 191.
8. Id. at 364-65, 355 S.E.2d at 191. The Millers described the premises as follows:
Mrs. Miller... stated that there were naked wires about the hot water heater which
would shoot fire .... [She] stated that she informed defendant in writing that there were
holes in the living room walls, that the light fixtures were hanging out, that the plaster and
the paint were falling from the ceiling, that there were holes in the bathroom walls, that the
commode was getting ready to fall through the floor, that the kitchen sink and cabinets
were rotted out, that the back porch had a hole in it, that screens were falling off, and that
the front porch was rotting out.
... Mr. Miller stated that... there was a cess pool in the backyard where water stood
and collected, causing a foul odor. Mrs. Miller stated that the odor was particularly offen-
sive when water was used in the house, such as when doing laundry, or when it rained.
Brief for Appellants at 6, Miller (No. 8621DC1059).
9. Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 365, 355 S.E.2d at 191.
10. Id.
11. The Millers alleged that Myers violated N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(a)(1) (1984) by failing to
comply with the local housing code, that Myers violated § 42-42(a)(2) (1984) by failing to repair and
"keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition," and that Myers violated § 42-42(a)(4) by failing
to maintain electrical and plumbing facilities. Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 364, 355 S.E.2d at 190.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 364, 355 S.E.2d at 190-91.
14. Id. at 368, 355 S.E.2d at 193.
15. N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) allows a defending party to move for dismissal when the opposing
party has failed "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
16. Reported decisions of the North Carolina appellate courts had previously interpreted the
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In an opinion -delivered by Judge Becton, the court construed the Act to
overrule prior case law17 and to create "implicitly" an implied warranty of hab-
itability in residential leaseholds.1 8 Noting that the Act makes the tenant's obli-
gation to pay and the landlord's obligation to repair "mutually dependent,"' 9
and that a tenant may not withhold rent prior to a "judicial determination" of
the right to do so, 20 the court interpreted the Act to provide an affirmative ac-
tion for retroactive rent abatement.21 The court rejected as statutorily inade-
quate a damage formula that would have awarded the Millers only the difference
between the rent paid and the actual value of the premises. The court deemed
the rent actually charged irrelevant in computing damages:
The rental or lease of residential premises for a price that is "fair" or
below fair rental value does not absolve the landlord of his statutory
obligation to provide fit premises and is not a defense to plaintiff's
claims. The implied warranty of habitability entitles a tenant in pos-
session of leased premises to the value of the premises as warranted,
which may be greater than the rent agreed upon or paid.... Accord-
ingly, a tenant may recover damages in the form of a rent abatement
calculated as the difference between the fair rental value of the prem-
ises if as warranted (i.e., in full compliance with G.S. 42-42(a)) and the
fair rental value of the premises in their unfit condition for any period
of the tenant's occupancy during which the finder of fact determines
the premises were uninhabitable, plus any special or consequential
damages alleged and proved. 22
Residential Rental Agreements Act only in cases of personal injury or wrongful death. Miller, 85
N.C. App. at 367, 355 S.E.2d at 192; see supra note 4.
17. Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 368, 355 S.E.2d at 193. In a pre-Act case, the court of appeals had
held that a tenant could not recover rent paid for a dwelling that was unfit for human habitation.
Thompson v. Shoemaker, 7 N.C. App. 687, 690-91, 173 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1970). The Miller court
construed the Residential Rental Agreements Act "to provide an affirmative cause of action to a
tenant for recovery of rent paid based on the landlord's noncompliance with G.S. 42-42(a) and, thus,
to overrule Thompson v. Shoemaker." Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 368, 355 S.E.2d at 193.
18. Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 366-68, 355 S.E.2d at 191-93. Although many considered the Act
to create an implied warranty of habitability, see Charlotte Observer, May 17, 1977, at 18A, col. 1;
News & Observer (Raleigh), May 27, 1977, at 4, col. 1, some courts and commentators have doubted
the creation of an actual warranty. See Jackson v. Housing Auth., 73 N.C. App. 363, 326 S.E.2d 295
(1985) (to the extent any implied warranty exists, it is "co-extensive" with the Act), aff'd, 316 N.C.
259, 341 S.E.2d 523 (1986); see also Note, Another Look at the Implied Warranty of Habitability in
North Carolina, 64 N.C.L. Ray. 869, 869-70 n.10 (1986) ("North Carolina has not adopted an
implied warranty of habitability with respect to leasing agreements."). The point may be only tech-
nical; although the Act contains references to "mutually dependent" duties, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-
41 (1984), and requires that premises be "in a fit and habitable condition," Id. § 42-42(a)(2), no-
where in the statute can the direct term "implied warranty of habitability" be found. See infra note
37.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-41 (1984).
20. Id. § 42-44(c).
21. Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 370-71, 355 S.E.2d at 194.
22. Id. at 370, 355 S.E.2d at 194 (citations omitted). In adopting this formula, the court cited
an early analysis of the Residential Rental Agreements Act written by Theodore 0. Fillette III, who
had been one of the drafters of the Act. See Fillette, North Carolina'sResidentialRentalAgreements
Act" New Developments for Contract and Tort Liability in Landlord-Tenant Relations, 56 N.C.L.
REv. 785, 792 (1978). Fillette advocated an identical damages formula and observed that "the value
of the premises as warranted may be more than the rent actually paid by the tenant or agreed to be
paid in the lease." Id. at 792-93 (citing Troitino v. Goodman, 225 N.C. 406, 413, 35 S.E.2d 277, 282
(1945) (similar damage measure adopted under merchantability principles for sales of goods)).
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The adoption of such a formula results in an expansive remedy for tenants and,
as such, marks a drastic change in the attitude of North Carolina courts toward
landlord-tenant relations.
Historically, North Carolina adhered to the landlord-tenant principles
adopted in feudal England, under which the law imposed no duty on the land-
lord to provide or maintain any structures on the land.23 When the landlord
made an express covenant to repair, a breach of the covenant did not excuse the
tenant of the duty to pay rent.24 This common-law doctrine has been explained
as well-suited to fifteenth-century England, where leaseholds were established
primarily for agricultural purposes.25 The tenant farmer in a subsistence econ-
omy was virtually a jack-of-all-trades, and the law of waste required the tenant
to make all repairs in order to protect the landlord's reversionary interest in the
property.26
Nearly all jurisdictions in the United States followed the common-law doc-
trine absolving the landlord of any duty to repair until the 1960s, when courts
began to recognize changes in the landlord-tenant relationship. 27 In the
landmark case of Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,28 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia observed the obvious differences be-
tween the feudal farmer and the modem urban residential tenant: urban tenants
are not usually skilled in the complex maintenance work required in modem
dwellings, are increasingly mobile and cannot justify expenditures for long-term
repairs, are unable to obtain financing for such repairs, and lack sufficient bar-
gaining power to protect their expectations of adequate facilities.29 The Javins
court noted that the social impact of substandard housing "has led to the reali-
zation that poor housing is detrimental to the whole society, not merely to the
unlucky ones who must suffer the daily indignity of living in a slum." °30 These
factors convinced the court that an implied warranty of habitability, based on
23. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 122-23 (3d ed. 1923). North Caro-
lina adhered to the no-repair rule as late as 1970. See Thompson v. Shoemaker, 7 N.C. App. 687,
690-91, 173 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1970).
24. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW o PROPERTY § 6.36, at 302
(1984).
25. Id. § 2.17, at 85.
26. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 & n.30, 1078 (D.C. Cir.), cert
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); see also 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 122-23 (outlining ten-
ant's duties at common law).
27. See, e-g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426,429-34,462 P.2d 470,472-75 (1969); Reste Realty
Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 454-58, 251 A.2d 268, 273-75 (1969) (citing Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.
2d 590, 595-96, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (1961) (caveat emptor is an "obnoxious legal cliche")).
Although these courts adopted implied warranties of habitability in residential leases, the case of
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970),
caught the attention of the legal community and set in motion widespread adoption of that doctrine.
See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
28. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
29. Id. at 1078-79. Some commentators have argued that the warranty should not protect
those tenants who do not actually "expect" quality facilities. See Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing
Code and Tenant Remedies: An Integration, 56 B.U.L. REV. 1, 22 (1976); Krieger & Shurn, Land-
lord-Tenant Law: Indiana at the Crossroads, 10 IND. L. REv. 591, 616 (1977).
30. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1079-80. For a discussion of the value to society of an increase in
available minimum quality, low-income housing, see infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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municipal housing codes, must be read into every residential lease. 31
The logic of the Javins opinion proved appealing, and over the next decade
a large majority of states adopted the implied warranty of habitability for resi-
dential leaseholds, either by statute or case law. 32 These developments paral-
31. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1080. Housing codes as a means of insuring quality dwellings have
become common throughout the country, beginning with New York's Tenement House Law of
1867. Act of May 14, 1867, ch. 908, § 1-19, 1867 N.Y. Laws 2265 (repealed by N.Y. Tenement
House Law § 171 (McKinney 1916)). As a result of the 1954 Federal Housing Act, over 4,000
communities adopted code regulations. NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE
AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 276-77 (1968). Typically, housing
codes provide for a progressive scale of enforcement, from violation notices with no penalties to
eventual court-ordered demolition of unfit dwellings. See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D.
WHITMAN, supra note 24, § 6.37, at 309. For a discussion of the relative benefits of simple code
enforcement over the implied warranty of habitability, see infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
32. At least 43 states have adopted the implied warranty of habitability. See Jack Spring, Inc.
v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744
(Ind. Ct. App. 1976); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Kline v. Bums, 111
N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 34.03.100, .160, .180 (1985); AmuZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1324 to 33-1365 (1974 & West Supp,
1987); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1941, 1942 (West 1985) (superseding Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d
616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47a-7, -12, -13 (West
1978 & Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 5303, 5309 (1974 & Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 83.51-.56 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-13 (1982); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 521-42,
-64 (1985) (superseding Lemle Y. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969)); IDAHO CODE § 6-320
(1979); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 562A.15 to .21 (West Supp. 1987) (superseding Mease v. Fox, 200
N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972)); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-2553 to -2559 (1983) (superseding Steele v.
Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974)); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 383.595-.640 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (1980); MD. REAL PROP. CODE.
ANN. § 8-211 (1981 & Supp. 1987); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, §§ 127A to 127L (Law. Co-op. 1985
& Cum Supp. 1987) (superseding Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d
831 (1973)); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1109 (Callaghan 1982) (superseding Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich.
App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.18 (West Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 70-24-101 to -442 (1987); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 76-1419 to -1427 (1986); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 118A.290 to .350 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-8-20 to -33 (1982 & Supp. 1987); N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-38 to -44 (1984); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 47-16-13.1 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 5321.04 to .07 (Anderson 1981); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 118 to 120 (West 1986); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 91.770 to 91.800-.817 (1987); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Purdon 1977) (superseding Commonwealth v. Monumental Proper-
ties, 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974)); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18-22 to -30 (Supp. 1986); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 27-40 to 140 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-32-8, -32-9
(1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66- 28-304, -501 to -502 (1982); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 92.051-
.061 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4451-4468 (Supp. 1987) (superseding
Hilder v. St. Peter, 144 Vt. 150, 478 A.2d 202 (1984)); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.13 to .30 (1986 &
Supp. 1987); WASH. REv. CODE A N. §§ 59.18.060-.120 (Supp. 1987) (superseding Foisy v. Wy-
man, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973)); W. VA. CODE § 37-6-30 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 704.07 (West 1981 & Supp. 1987) (superseding Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409
(1961); see also Hall v. Warren, 692 P.2d 737, 738-39 (Utah 1984) (building code standards imposed
on every residential landlord, but court did not "reach the issue of whether there is a duty imposed
... by an implied warranty of habitability"). In states where the implied warranty of habitability
was adopted first by the courts and later by statute, the statutes usually are silent on damages and
thus do not overrule formulas adopted by the courts.
At least five states, California, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota, had
earlier enacted statutes, derived from the model Civil Code drafted by David D. Field, requiring
lessees to "put [dwellings] into a condition fit for such occupation, and to repair all subsequent
dilapidations thereof." Reppy, The Field Codification Concept, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTE-
NARY ESSAYS 17, 48 (A. Reppy ed. 1949).
Louisiana has followed the equivalent of an implied warranty of habitability under its version of
French civil law since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The modem codification is LA. CIV.
CODE. ANN. arts. 2692 to 2695, 2716 to 2717 (West 1952).
The Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, and Mississippi courts have expressly refused to adopt the
implied warranty of habitability. See Martin v. Springdale Stores, Inc., 354 So. 2d 1144, 1145-46
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leled similar measures adopted to protect the purchasers of fee interests in new
homes.3 3
Following the lead of other states, North Carolina slowly began cutting its
common-law ties in transfers of real property interests. First, in the 1974 case of
Hartley v. Ballou,34 the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized an implied
warranty of habitability in the sale of newly constructed houses. 35 One year
later, however, the court of appeals refused to apply the warranty to residential
rentals, and deferred instead to the general assembly for adoption of any changes
in the treatment of residential rental agreements. 36
The general assembly's enactment of the Residential Rental Agreements
Act in 1977 created new tenant rights by making mutually dependent the ten-
ant's duty to pay rent and the landlord's duties to make repairs, keep common
areas safe, maintain fixtures, and otherwise comply with building and housing
codes. 37
The tenant's rights under the Act, of course, are not absolute. One particu-
larly curious component of the Act is its requirement that "[t]he tenant may not
unilaterally withhold rent prior to a judicial determination of a right to do so. ''38
This language appears to be unique among states enacting the implied warranty
by statute,3 9 yet the requirement complements the landlord's prohibition from
evicting defaulting tenants through self-help.40 Similarly, the Act recognizes the
potential problems of tenant waste and destruction by requiring the tenant to
maintain the dwelling unit "as clean and safe as the conditions of the premises
permit."4 1 Although North Carolina acted late in abandoning the doctrine of
(Ala. 1978) (implied warranty of fitness applies only to newly constructed homes, not residential
leases); Alston v. Kahn, 242 Ark. 47, 48, 411 S.W.2d 659, 660 (1967); Blackwell v. Del Bosco, 191
Colo. 344, 348, 558 P.2d 563, 565 (1976); Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So. 2d 378, 380 (Miss. 1982).
Neither the state legislature nor courts of Wyoming appear to have addressed the issue.
33. See generally McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 283-91, 398 A.2d 1283, 1287-91 (1979)
(discussing the history of implied warranty of habitability for sales of new homes).
34. 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974).
35. Id. at 62, 209 S.E.2d at 783.
36. Knuckles v. Spaugh, 26 N.C. App. 340, 340, 215 S.E.2d 825, 826, cert. denied, 288 N.C.
241, 217 S.E.2d 665 (1975).
37. The Act provides that "[t]he tenant's obligation to pay rent under the rental agreement or
assignment and to comply with G.S. 42-43 and the landlord's obligation to comply with G.S. 42-
42(a) shall be mutually dependent." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-41 (1984). Section 42-42(a) provides in
part that the landlord shall
[c]omply with the current applicable building and housing codes .... [m]ake all repairs and
do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition,
[and] [m]aintain in good and safe working order and promptly repair all electrical, plumb-




39. See statutes cited supra note 32. One result of the "judicial determination" clause has been
to prevent tenants from repairing defects themselves and deducting rental payments accordingly.
See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
40. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-25(6) (1984) (landlord must resort to summary ejectment pro-
ceedings in order to evict tenant).
41. Id. § 42-43(a)(1).
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caveat emptor42 for-residential tenancies, the policy shift, once begun, was com-
plete. Both landlord and tenant now have mutual duties to protect one another's
interests, and neither may gain redress except through the courts.43
Conspicuously absent from the Act are any specified remedies for aggrieved
tenants. Although section 42-44 of the North Carolina General Statutes
prescribes existing remedies "by civil action" and "other remedies of law and in
equity," 44 the determination of a tenant's damages when the warranty is
breached has been left to the courts. The North Carolina appellate courts first
addressed the damages issue in tort actions. The landlord's failure to keep com-
mon areas well lighted,4 5 to repair the steps of leased premises,4 6 and to main-
tain heating equipment 47 have all been acknowledged as violations of the Act in
cases of personal injury and death.
Miller provided the appellate courts with their first opportunity to consider
what remedies, if any, exist under the Act on a theory of contract. The court of
appeals in Miller observed that leading decisions from other jurisdictions have
held that a tenant who remains in possession may have a cause of action for
recoupment of all or part of rents paid.48
The Miller court rejected the landlord's argument that rent abatement
under the Act amounted to a statutory "penalty or forfeiture" under the state's
one-year statute of limitations.49 Construing such damages as "in the nature of
a restitutionary remedy," the court instead applied the general three-year civil
statute of limitations.5 0 Because the Millers' suit was filed in May 1985, they
were required to establish on remand that the alleged violations existed after
May 1982 and could recover for any period after that date.51
42. The term caveat emptor, "[I]et the buyer beware, . . . summarized the rule that a purchaser
must examine, judge and test for himself." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979).
43. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-44(c) (tenant may not withhold rent before adjudication); Id.
§ 42-25(6) (landlord may evict only by summary ejectment proceedings). A landlord, by virtue of
greater wealth, may of course be in a much better position than a low-income tenant to assert her
rights in court.
44. Id. § 42-44(a).
45. O'Neal v. Kellet, 55 N.C. App. 225, 284 S.E.2d 707 (1981).
46. Brooks v. Francis, 57 N.C. App. 556, 291 S.E.2d 889 (1982).
47. Jackson v. Housing Auth., 73 N.C. App. 363, 326 S.E.2d 295 (1985), aff'd, 316 N.C. 259,
341 S.E.2d 523 (1986).
48. 85 N.C. App. at 367-68, 355 S.E.2d at 192 (citing Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa
1972); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460,
308 A.2d 17 (1973); Teller v. McCoy, 162 W.Va. 367, 253 S.E.2d 114 (1978)).
49. Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 368, 355 S.E.2d at 193. Section 1-54 provides for commencement
of a cause of action, "[w]ithin one year [for] an action or proceeding ... (2) Upon a statute, for a
penalty or forfeiture, where the action is given to the State alone, or in whole or in part to the party
aggrieved, or to a common informer, except where the statute imposing it prescribes a different
limitation." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-54 (1983).
50. Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 368-69, 355 S.E.2d at 193. Section 1-52 provides for commence-
ment of a cause of action "[w]ithin three years [for] an action-(1) Upon a contract, obligation or
liability arising out of a contract, express or implied .... (2) Upon a liability created by statute,
either state or federal, unless some other time is mentioned in the statute creating it." N.C. GEN,
STAT. § 1-52 (1983).
51. Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 369, 355 S.E.2d at 193. The court held that tenants can recover for
the three most recent years of violations because a landlord's letting of unfit premises "constitute[s] a
continuing offense." Id. In Gaito v. Auman, 313 N.C. 243, 250, 327 S.E.2d 870, 876 (1985), the
North Carolina Supreme Court adopted a "reasonableness" test for determining how long the im-
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Although it upheld the Millers' claim under the Act, the court affirmed a
denial of punitive damages. 52 Because "[tihe action for a rent abatement for
breach of an implied warranty of habitability is wholly contractual," the court
followed the North Carolina rule that punitive damages are not recoverable in
contract even though the breach is "wilful, malicious, or oppressive."'5 3 The
decision therefore makes the implied warranty of habitability identical, at least
in form, to the contract warranty of merchantability.5 4
Miller is most significant, however, in that the court, under the rubric of a
"restitutionary remedy," enacted a measure of damages that goes beyond mere
protection of a tenant's personal expectations.55 If the damage formula en-
dorsed by the court is not a "penalty,"5 6 it also cannot be considered mere resto-
ration: a tenant who knowingly enters a lease for substandard facilities cannot
be said to "expect" conformity with the implied warranty of habitability as that
term is used in traditional contract law.5 7
Other jurisdictions determining the proper measure of damages for breach
of the implied warranty of habitability have set forth four basic formulas the
Miller court could adopt. First, some courts have simply awarded the tenant the
cost of repairing and upgrading the premises. 58 This measure is considered ap-
propriate, however, only in states where unilateral tenant self-help is allowed in
plied warranty of habitability protects the purchaser of a new home. The court held that the facts of
each case would determine whether a home is "new" for warranty purposes. Id. at 250, 325 S.E.2d
at 876. The Gaito holding is akin to the common-law doctrine of laches, by which the neglect to
assert a claim, taken together with a lapse of time and other circumstances prejudicial to the adverse
party, operates as a bar in a court of equity. See Wooded Shores Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Mathews, 37
Ill. App. 3d 334, 338, 345 N.E.2d 186, 189 (1976).
A court's application of a "reasonableness" standard to the landlord-tenant situation would be
inappropriate, because the residential tenancy involves an ongoing contractual relationship (unlike
the vendor-purchaser relationship in sales of homes), and because such a rule would likely run afoul
of the Act's prohibition against tenant waiver. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42(b) (1984).
52. Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 371-72, 355 S.E.2d at 195.
53. Id. (citing Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976)); Murray
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 51 N.C. App. 10, 275 S.E.2d 195 (1981)). Fillette has argued, however, that
violations of the Act might constitute unfair or deceptive trade practices under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-1.1 (1985), so as to allow an award of treble damages under § 75-16 (1985). See Fillette, supra
note 22, at 800.
54. The warranty of merchantability, part of the state's Uniform Commercial Code, provides in
pertinent part:
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification ... he may recover as
damages for any nonconformity of tender the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events
from the seller's breach as determined in any manner which is reasonable.
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty [for sale of goods] is the ditfer-
ence at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the
value they would have had if they had been as warranted....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-714 (1986). Both the implied warranty of merchantability and the damage
formula adopted in Miller award a party the difference between the warranted value of the "good"
and its defective value. For differences in the effect of these two formulas, see infra note 57 and
accompanying text.
55. Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 368-69, 355 S.E.2d at 193-94.
56. Id. at 368, 355 S.E.2d at 193.
57. "Expectation" or "loss-of-bargain" damages in contract compensate the promisee for the
loss of the value the promisee subjectively expected to receive through the bargain. See Fuller &
Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54, 57 (1936).
58. Eg., Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460,472-73, 308 A.2d 17, 22-23 (1973); Katurah Corp. v.
Wells, 115 Misc. 2d 16, 17, 454 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa.
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repairing the dwelling.5 9
A second measure adopted by other states has been a "percentage diminu-
tion approach," which allows abatement of a percentage of the rent equal to the
percentage reduction in use and enjoyment a jury determines the tenant to have
suffered. 6° This formula appears to be the most common measure adopted by
courts that have actually set damages,61 possibly because it avoids the problems
of acquiring expert testimony to establish the market rental value.62
Third, some jurisdictions have set the measure of damages as the difference
between the agreed rent and the fair rental value of the premises in their defec-
tive condition.63 Such a rule requires the tenant to pay the fair value of what is
Super. 76, 88, 384 A.2d 1234, 1240-41 (1978), aff'd, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979); Hilder v. St.
Peter, 144 Vt. 150, 163, 478 A.2d 202, 207, 209 (1984).
59. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. North Carolina's provision that "[t]he ten-
ant may not unilaterally withhold rent," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-44(c) (1984), along with an absence
of any self-help language in the Act, would seem to preclude the self-repair allowed in many states.
No North Carolina appellate court, however, has addressed the question. Fillette has argued:
Given the general rules on mitigation of damages, it would seem unreasonable to require a
tenant who is willing and able to make small repairs to bring suit to recover his costs rather
than allowing him to deduct them directly from his rent. If faced with a situation in which
the tenant has made a repair and deducted the cost from his rent, the North Carolina
courts could treat the tenant not as if he had "withheld" his rent, but rather as if he had
simply applied the rent, on the landlord's behalf, to the cost of repairing the premises.
Such a construction would avoid the prohibition against the unilateral withholding of rent
set forth in section 42-44(c).
Fillette, supra note 22, at 796 (citations omitted). North Carolina General Statute § 44(c) seems to
contradict other provisions of the Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-44(a) (1984). Section 42-44(a) allows
a tenant to enforce her rights "by civil action" and an "action" is defined in the Act to mean "re-
coupment, counterclaim, defense, setof, and any other proceeding including an action for posses-
sion." Id. § 42-40(1). This implies that, although the Act purports to preclude a tenant from
withholding rent, it contemplates raising the landlord's failure to repair as a defense to a suit against
the tenant for failure to pay rent. See Jordan v. Miller, 179 N.C. 73, 75, 101 S.E. 550, 551-52 (1919)
(in tort action against landlord by employee of tenant, court noted that if landlord breached express
covenant to repair boarding house, the duty of the tenant was to make the repairs himself and to
"recover the cost in an action for that purpose, or upon a counterclaim in action for rent"). If a
tenant were to repair and deduct from the rental payments, and the landlord were then to sue for
eviction, a court might construe the tenant's action as a "defense" or "set-off" under § 42-44(a) as
opposed to a "unilateral withholding" of rent under § 44(c). See also Cato Ladies Modes, Inc. v.
Pope, 21 N.C. App. 133, 135, 203 S.E.2d 405, 406 (1974) (recognizing the use of self-help for com-
mercial tenants when the landlord breached an express covenant to repair).
60. This measure of damages is similar to that adopted in the Restatement (Second) of Prop-
erty: "If the tenant is entitled to an abatement of the rent, the rent is abated to the amount of that
proportion of the rent which the fair rental value after the event giving the right to abate bears to the
fair rental value before the event." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD AND TEN-
ANT § 11.1 (1977). Because the Restatement formula is based on determining market rental value,
expert testimony is generally required. R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 6, § 3:25, at 143. Under the
normal "percentage diminution" approach, the jury determines the percentage of enjoyment lost
without the aid of experts.
61. Eg., Cooks v. Fowler, 455 F.2d 1281, 1282-83 (D.C. App. 1971); Cazares v. Ortiz, 109 Cal.
App. 3d Supp. 23, 33, 168 Cal. Rptr. 108, 113 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1980); Academy Spires,
Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 488, 268 A.2d 556, 562 (1970); Morbeth Realty Corp.v. Rosen-
shine, 67 Misc. 2d 325, 327, 323 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971); see also 111 East 88th
Partners v. Simon, 106 Misc. 2d 693, 696, 434 N.Y.S.2d 886, 889 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980) (percentage
diminution damages added to "as warranted" damage award).
62. Abbott, supra note 29, at 22-24.
63. Eg., Welborn v. Society for Propogation of Faith, 411 N.E.2d 1267, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 93-94, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971); Bay Park One Co. v. Crosby,
109 Misc. 2d 47,47,442 N.Y.S.2d 837, 838 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Lane v. Kelley, 57 Or. App. 197,
201, 643 P.2d 1375, 1377, cert denied, 293 Or. 394, 650 P.2d 927 (1982); Beausang v. Bernotas, 296
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actually received and therefore denies traditional loss-of-bargain damages. 64
This measure, advocated by the landlord in Miller,65 provides a tenant with only
nominal damages if the premises were rented at fair market value, or if the mar-
ket value exceeds the rent actually paid.66
Fourth, the expansive view adopted by the Miller court, in which the actual
rent paid is not considered in the damage formula, appears to have been en-
dorsed by courts in only three jurisdictions. 67 Courts adopting this measure of
damages have awarded the tenant the difference in the value of the premises if
conforming to the implied warranty and the rental value of the premises in their
defective condition. This view has been criticized as inappropriate, however,
when substandard conditions exist at the commencement of the tenancy, on the
ground that the tenant has knowingly not bargained for premises satisfying the
implied warranty. 68
Pa. Super. 335, 341, 442 A.2d 796, 799 (1982); see also Glasoe v. Trinlde, 107 Ill. 2d 1, 17, 479
N.E.2d 915, 921 (1985) (market value approach adopted, but agreed rent may be considered evi-
dence of such value).
64. See supra note 57.
65. 85 N.C. App. at 370, 355 S.E.2d at 194.
66. R. SCHOSHIlNSKI, supra note 6, § 3:25, at 142.
67. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 638, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 715
(1974); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Teller v. McCoy, 162 W. Va. 367, 391, 253
S.E.2d 114, 128 (1978); see also Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 336, 521 P.2d 304, 310 (1974)
("traditional remedies for breach of contract" available to aggrieved tenant). At least four other
jurisdictions have endorsed the "as warranted" formula, but have expressly stated that the actual
rent negotiated should be considered evidence of the market value of the premises if conforming to
the warranty. See Cooks v. Fowler, 455 F.2d 1281, 1282 n.5 (D.C. App. 1971); Glasoe v. Trinkle,
107 Ill. 2d 1, 17, 479 N.E.2d 915, 921-22 (1985); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184,
203, 293 N.E.2d 831, 845 (1973); Hilder v. St. Peter, 144 Vt. 150, 161, 478 A.2d 202, 209 (1984).
This latter variation, in which the rent paid by the plaintiff is considered as evidence of the fair
rental value of the premises conforming to the implied warranty, was recently endorsed by the North
Carolina Court of Appeals in Cotton v. Stanley, 86 N.C. App. 534, 358 S.E.2d 692 (1987). Cotton,
decided three months after Miller by a different three-judge panel, involved a class action by tenants
against a landlord who allegedly failed to correct violations of the Residential Rental Agreements
Act by the repair deadline set by the Raleigh Housing Code. Citing Miller, the court held that
landlords who violate the Act are liable for the fair rental value of a unit "as is" and the fair rental
value "as warranted" for the period between the expiration of a "reasonable opportunity to repair"
after notice from the housing inspector and the date repairs are made. Id., at 539, 358 S.E.2d at 695-
56. The court stated that "[tihe rent agreed upon by the parties when entering into the lease is some
evidence of the property's 'as warranted' fair rental value, but it is not binding." Id., at 539, 358
S.E.2d at 695.
This interpretation arguably contravenes the purposes of the Residential Rental Agreements
Act. A tenant's damage award under Miller equals the amount by which the quality of premises
falls below the warranty's fixed standards, yet the Cotton court would allow the "as warranted"
value of the premises to vary according to the agreed rent. The Miller court rejected such a view,
stating that a low rental price "does not absolve the landlord of his statutory obligation to provide fit
premises." Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 370, 355 S.E.2d at 194. A tenant's acceptance of a low rent
which is later adopted as the "as warranted" value of the premises is tantamount to a "waiver" of
the fixed warranty standard, something the Act expressly prohibits. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-
42(b) (1984).
68. Abbott, supra note 29, at 22; Krieger & Shurn, supra note 29, at 616. One commentator
has noted that, when tenants are never deemed to have waived warranty rights, and when a measure
of damages similar to that in Miller has been adopted, a landlord might have to pay the tenant to live
in the substandard dwelling.
[I]f the value as warranted is $150, the contract rent is $60, and the fair rental value of the
premises in its actual condition is $50, damages under the difference in value rule would be
... $100. Therefore, the reasonable rental value would be equal to the contract rent ($60)
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The Miller court did not provide a rationale for awarding this additional
compensation to tenants, except to state that such a measure was necessary to
fulfill the "statutory obligations" set forth in the Act.69 Commentators have
criticized "statutory obligations" that do more than protect an aggrieved party's
expectations as an economically unjust and ill-fitted means of bettering the
plight of those trapped in low-income housing.70 When the broader purposes of
the warranty are considered, however, economic justification for the additional
compensation awarded under Miller becomes apparent.
The court in Javins7 1 considered the detriment accruing to society from
substandard housing as a compelling reason for adoption of the implied war-
ranty of habitability.72 Similarly, benefits beyond those of the aggrieved tenant
have been recognized in North Carolina as a basis for requiring minimum hous-
ing standards. In 1969, the general assembly outlined the collective benefit re-
sulting from the elimination of substandard housing:
The General Assembly hereby finds and declares that as a result of the
spread of slum conditions and blight.., there exists in the State of
North Carolina a serious shortage of decent, safe and sanitary residen-
tial housing available at low prices or rentals to persons and families of
lower income. This shortage is severe in certain urban areas of the
State, is especially critical in the rural areas, and is inimical to the
health, safety, welfare and prosperity of all residents of the State and to
the sound growth of North Carolina communities. 73
In this context the additional compensation awarded under the Miller
formula can be viewed as analogous to what economists refer to as collective or
"public" goods.74 These are those goods and services from which every member
of society benefits, but which no one person has incentive to fund individually.75
Examples of public goods include public highways, national defense, public
less damages ($100), or -$40 ... forcing a landlord to pay a tenant $40 per month to live in
the premises worth $50 a month.
Note, The Great Green Hope: The Implied Warranty of Habitability in Practice, 28 STAN. L. REV.
729, 764 n.162 (1976).
69. Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 370, 355 S.E.2d at 194.
70. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
72. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1079-80.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122A-2 (1986) (enacted 1969) (emphasis added). In the enabling act
for the promulgation of housing codes, the general assembly recognized that
the existence and occupation of dwellings in this State that are unfit for human habitation
are inimical to the welfare and dangerous and injurious to the health, safety and morals of
the people of this State, and that a public necessity exists for the repair, closing or demoli-
tion of such dwellings.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-441 (1987).
74. The term "public" good was derived from the works of the economist Paul Samuelson. See
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387-89 (1954).
75. E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, PUBLIC FINANCE AND THE PRICE SYSTEM 23-25 (2d ed.
1983). The authors define public goods as goods or services that have the two characteristics of
nonrival consumption and nonexclusion. A good is nonrival when, at a given level of production,
consumption by one person need not diminish the quantity consumed by others. Id. at 23. Nonex-
clusion exists when it is impossible, or prohibitively costly, to confine the benefits of the good to
selected persons. Id. at 24.
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parks, and the clean air resulting from automotive pollution controls.7 6
The societal benefit of housing code enforcement-whether direct, in the
form of safer and healthier communities, or indirect, in the form of the satisfac-
tion of having aided the destitute-justifies, at least in part, compensating the
tenant above the amount for which she actually bargained. 77 These benefits pre-
sumably better everyone, but it is difficult to imagine any one citizen stepping
forward to foot the repair bill for a low-income tenant. As with traditional pub-
lic goods, government action is required to upgrade the plight of all involved. 78
The results of improved low-income housing may be less immediately tangible
than the construction of highways, but this actually underscores the need for
legislative or judicial action to reduce the adverse effects of unfit housing.79
In Miller the court of appeals did no more than attempt to give full effect to
the policies of the general assembly.80 Had the court simply required a landlord
to limit the rental price to the fair market value of the defective dwelling, the
tenant may have been protected from a loss of expectation, but the people of the
state-and the tenants themselves-would be prohibited from receiving the pur-
portedly broader benefits of the Act. This greater purpose could only be prq-
served by guaranteeing low-income tenants the monetary equivalent of code-
quality housing.8 1
The courts, however, lack the power to give the goals of the general assem-
bly full realization when landlords can avoid the consequences of the Miller de-
cision. Dean Charles Meyers of the American Law Institute has summarized
the consequences of a rigorously enforced warranty of habitability when land-
lords operate in a free market:
1) Some proportion of the substandard rental housing stock would be
upgraded and rents would be raised to cover the added costs ...
Those tenants who are unable or unwilling to pay for the upgraded
housing will move out, creating an increased demand for lower-priced,
lower-quality housing.
2) For some proportion of the substandard rental housing stock,
rents could not be raised, but landlords could still upgrade the housing
76. See id. at 23-29.
77. Justifying public desire to charitably aid those in low-income housing as being motivated by
self-interest is a concept not devoid of controversy. Implicit in such an explanation is the principle
of "egoism," which holds that all actions, including charity, are based on an individual's narrow self-
interest. Such a view is criticized in Harrison, Egoism, Altruism and Market Illusions, 33 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1309 (1986). The validity of the principle is not critical to analysis of the Miller decision;
regardless of motivation, the general assembly clearly has viewed the upgrading of low-income hous-
ing as necessary for the well-being of all citizens. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
78. See E. BROWNING & J. BROWNING, supra note 75, at 31-33.
79. Government action when benefits are not immediately tangible is frequently encountered.
For example, communities have flouridated drinking water to guarantee long-term dental health.
See Plant, Flouridation in a New England Town (report prepared for Univ. of Mich. School of Public
Health), reprinted in D. MACRAE & J. WILDE, POLICY ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC DECISIONs 248-262
(1979). The federal government has for some years considered legislation to restrict emission of
chloroflurocarbons, which destroy the earth's protective ozone layer. See (Raleigh) News & Ob-
server, Dec. 1, 1987, at 2A, col. 1; News & Observer (Raleigh), Oct. 18, 1987, at 7D, col. 1.
80. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
81. See Miller, 85 N.C. App. at 371, 355 S.E.2d at 194.
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without incurring a deficit. In these cases the tenants would enjoy a
short-term wealth transfer, for they would enjoy better housing at no
increase in rent. But low-income tenants as a class would not benefit in
the long run, for the covenant of habitability will retire this component
of the housing stock sooner than would otherwise be the case and will
discourage new investment in low-rent housing.
3) The third portion of the substandard housing stock will be aban-
doned as soon as the owner determines that income will not cover the
expense .... 
82
These same results, however, are likely to result to a lesser degree from
conventional housing code enforcement, even in the absence of the implied war-
ranty. Any policy that cuts into landlord profits will undoubtedly cause the
enterprising landlord to transfer resources to more productive investments.83 At
least one commentator has suggested that local housing codes without more may
actually prove superior to the statutory warranty, because underlying the hous-
ing code is a policy of discretionary administration.8 4 Enforcement of the code
is committed to the building inspectors who may gauge their enforcement dis-
cretion against the availability of local housing. The housing code, unlike the
implied warranty of habitability, "does not provide for rent abatement and rent
withholding, for those remedies frustrate the achievement of the code's objec-
tive, which is the maintenance of the housing stock and its improvement where
economically feasible in the judgment of knowledgeable public officials." 85
The Miller court, unlike a building inspector, could not look to the local
housing market in order to fashion a discretionary remedy. It was bound to
enforce the Residential Rental Agreements Act as written, and the legislative
goals underlying the State's housing policies suggest the court has done just
that.8 6 The Act and the insights of those drafting it intimate a mandate to the
82. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27 STAN, L. REV.
879, 893 (1975). The Meyers article was written to voice objection to the Institute's adoption, in its
second Restatement, of an implied warranty of habitability for residential rentals. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 11.1 (1977). For similar criticisms and
comments see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 16.6 (3d ed. 1986); Ackerman, Regulat-
ing Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income
Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique of the
Ackerman Analysis ofHousing Code Enforcement and the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 1175 (1973).
83. Of course, the general assembly might be tempted to consider methods of preventing land-
lords from abandoning the low-income market, but constitutional problems would abound. See First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2388 (1987) (gov-
ernment's deprivation of "all use" intended by property owner, even if deprivation only temporary,
requires compensation under "takings" clause of fifth amendment); Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 149 (1978) (inability of landowner to make a reasonable return on
property as a result of government regulation requires compensation). But see Robinson v. Diamond
Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (suggesting that landlords might be forbidden,
under retaliatory eviction theory, to abandon buildings as an alternative to housing code compliance
if they were "able" to comply). Alternative uses may not, however, immediately exist for slum
properties. Meyers, supra note 82, at 890-93.
84. Meyers, supra note 82, at 901-02.
85. Meyers, supra note 82, at 902 (emphasis added). The county manager of Wake County,
North Carolina, has said that his government was unwilling to enact even a discretionary housing
code unless it can first construct public housing for residents evicted from condemned dwellings.
News & Observer (Raleigh), Nov. 30, 1987, at IC, col. 5.
86. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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courts to fashion remedies for insuring minimum quality housing to the fullest
extent possible. 87 The unfortunate result, however, may be only to highlight and
exacerbate inadequacies in the structure of the Act itself. If the commentators
are correct, any damage measure under the implied warranty would encourage a
gradual worsening of the low-income housing situation. The Miller court's
enunciation of the most liberal formula possible only speeds up the process.
To predict the adverse effects of the Act under the Miller decision, however,
is not necessarily to call for demolition of the tenant-protection mechanism. The
broad damage formula of Miller, if combined with increased assertion of tenant
rights under the Act, may compel the general assembly to consider supplement-
ing the warranty with more direct income-redistribution measures.
Otherwise critical commentators have acknowledged that a warranty such
as the Residential Rental Agreements Act, with a stringent legal sanction such
as that adopted in Miller, can produce a long-term increase in quality housing
for the poor, so long as these policies are coupled with outright rent subsidiza-
tion. 88 Under such a scheme, tenants can afford to absorb any costs of repair
and maintenance passed on by landlords. 89 By offering a higher price, tenants
can more realistically bargain for and expect premises conforming to warranty
standards. The Miller damage formula would be transformed from a tenant
windfall into a mere preservation of the bargain between the parties to the lease
contract.90 At the same time, the warranty would serve to prevent "rapacious
slumlords" from devouring the increased wealth of tenants, without discourag-
ing continued investment in private market housing for the poor.91
The Residential Rental Agreements Act lay largely dormant during much
of its first ten years: investigation of the adverse consequences that might result
and the necessary supplements that might be required could be postponed long
into the future. The decision of the court of appeals in Miller, however, will
likely shorten the timetable for determining the actual level of public commit-
ment that exists for improving low-income housing. The Act under the Miller
87. See supra note 22.
88. See R. POSNER, supra note 82, § 16.6, at 446-47; Ackerman, supra note 82, at 1116-17; see
also Meyers, supra note 82, at 902 ("Raise the income of the poor and they can afford better
housing.").
89. The government can subsidize the low-income tenant in two ways. Low-income housing
can be directly supplemented by a general income subsidy to the poor with no restrictions on its use.
This method, called a "negative income tax," allows the tenant to decide which expenditure-more
rent for better housing or more money spent on other goods-results in the greatest individual hap-
piness. Of course, politically such a method may prove unpopular, because people want to channel
the beneficiaries' income to prevent "bad" choices.
The other method of subsidizing tenants is to restrict the use of the supplement to exclusively
housing-oriented expenditures. This can be done by paying the moneys directly to the landlords.
See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 190-95 (1962); Tobin, Raising the Incomes of the
Poor, in AGENDA FOR THE NATION 77-116 (K. Gordon ed. 1968); Ackerman, supra note 82, at
1119-22.
90. The Act would then be identical, in form and in substance, to the contract warranty of
merchantability. See supra note 54.
91. Meyers maintained that "[tihe classic view of the rapacious slumlord waxing fat as he milks
the property is a myth," even in the absence of an implied warranty of habitability. Meyers, supra
note 82, at 894 (citing empirical studies of George Sternlieb in G. STERNLIEB & R. BURCHELL,
RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT: THE TENEMENT LANDLORD REvISITED xvi-xvii (1973)).
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formula prevents tenants from losing the battle for adequate facilities only by
encouraging landlords to forego the war. So long as low-income tenants lack the
resources with which to bargain sufficiently for quality dwellings, Miller may
prove to be an unfortunate Pyrrhic victory, rather than a triumph of social pol-
icy, for the growing class of citizens in substandard housing.
Attempting to remedy the plight of the low-income tenant without addi-
tional public expenditure may well have been a prudent tactic for the general
assembly. It is only logical to avoid taxing the public when "taxing" the land-
lord seems possible. Yet if increased quality in housing is indeed a public
good,92 and if substandard housing is indeed "inimical to the health, safety, wel-
fare and prosperity of all residents of the State,"' 93 it appears equally as rational
to look to the public for funding. Reliance on landlord altruism at a time when
land is becoming more valuable94 and the low-income population of the North
Carolina is increasing,95 appears neither reasonable nor just. When landlords
may raise rents or abandon the market altogether, the general assembly, in order
to secure the public benefit, should require the public to pay the costs.
MARK ANDREW STAFFORD
92. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122A-2 (1986).
94. From the period 1974-1984, total assessed value of real property in North Carolina grew at
an annual compound rate of more than 11.5%. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, STATISTICS OF TAX-
ATION 163 (Biennial report, May 31, 1985).
95. A statewide committee, chaired by William C. Friday, investigated poverty in North Caro-
lina and concluded than more people are living in poverty in the State in the 1980s than were in the
preceding decade. COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY, POVERTY AND CIVIC
RESPONSIBILITY: A STATEMENT TO ALL NORTH CAROLINIANS § 6 (published by The Human
Services Institute, Greensboro, N.C. 1986). The Committee noted that Current Population Surveys
of the United States Bureau of Census indicate the percentage of North Carolinians living below
125% of the federal poverty threshold increased from 19.6% in 1980 to 22% in 1984. Id.
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